Programa

Mestrado em Economia

Programa

1. Static games of complete information: normal form games; IESDS; Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies; existence of Nash equilibrium 2. Applications of static games: Cournot model of duopoly; Bertrand model of duopoly; the problem of the commons 3. Dynamic games of complete and perfect information: backwards induction; Stackelberg model of duopoly; sequential bargaining 4. Dynamic games of complete but imperfect information: subgame perfection; finitely repeated games; infinitely repeated games and folk theorem; 5. Bayesian games: Bayesian Nash equilibrium; incentive compatibility; the revelation principle 6. Static bilateral contracts: screening; signaling; moral hazard; adverse selection 7. Static multilateral contracts: multilateral hidden information; auctions 8. Incomplete contracts: problems of ownership and control